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RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON 
Trustee for CAPE TRUST, 
In The 
SUPREME COURT 
Of The 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Supreme Court 
No. 18330 
This is a case in negligent misrepresentation or 
constructive fraud against the appellant, a title insurance 
company, for making misrepresentations which culminated in an 
Ackowledgment signed by said appellant to the effect that 
appellant had the beneficial interest in five (5) promissory 
notes secured by trust deeds on five (5) parcels of real 
property when in fact it did not. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup and resulted in a judgment against the appellant 
and in favor of the respondent. The lower court subsequently 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
denied appellant's post trial motions for a new trial and/or to 
alter and amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the decision of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cape Trust (hereinafter referred to as respondent) 
does not entirely agree with the statement of facts in 
appellant's brief. (Appellant will hereinafter be referred to 
as "Commonwealth".) One of the problems with Commonwealth's 
statement of facts is that it states several immaterial facts 
so as to confuse the facts of the case. There are also some 
material facts that are omitted in Commonwealth's statement of 
facts. 
The relevant facts are set forth in the court's 
Findings of Fact, including an ammendment thereto, and they are 
all supported by substantial evidence in the record. The 
material facts can be summarized as follows: 
1. Commonwealth is a title insurance company and 
licensed escrow agent holding themselves out as experts in real 
estate and Commonwealth was hired in this transaction because 
of Commonwealth's expertise in real estate and to verify the 
status of the real estate involved in this case. (Tr 12 24 
. ' ' 
36, 39, 43, 56, 171-172) 
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2. That on March 1, 1977, Commonwealth and AGLA 
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AGLA") 
entered into an escrow agreement wherein AGLA conveyed title to 
seventy-four lots in a subdivision to Commonwealth as trustee 
and with other escrow instructions concerning the sale of those 
lots and the payment of the proceeds therefrom to AGLA and its 
assigns. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-2) 
3. That on October 4, 1978, AGLA made an Assignment 
to the respondent of the proceeds from the sale of the lots in 
escrow with Commonwealth. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3) 
4. That on October 4, 1978, Commonwealth executed an 
Acknowledgment that Commonwealth was in possession of the 
beneficial interest in promissory notes and trust deeds 
covering the subdivision lots, including the five lots involved 
in this litigation. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3 [reverse side]) 
5. That in reliance upon the representations of 
Commonwealth and the Acknowledgment, the respondent accepted 
the Assignment in satisfaction of an obligation that AGLA had 
incurred in favor of the respondent in 1977. (Tr. 15, 16, 17, 
24, 31-32, 35, 42-43, 47) 
6. That in reality at the time of the Acknowledgment, 
Commonwealth did not have the beneficial interest in the notes 
and trust deeds on the five lots because the proceeds from 
those sales had been paid to a separate entity, Capitol Thrift 
& Loan, (hereinafter Capitol) on April 12, 1978, on an entirely 
separate obligation owed from AGLA to Capitol. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit P-4) 
-3-
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7. That had the respondent received the proceeds 
from the five lots it would have received $21 ,680.00 together 
with interest at 10% per annum from October 7, 1977 until 
April 7, 1978, and thereafter at the rate of 18% per annum. 
(Tr. 23; Plaintiff's Exhibit P-2; Defendant's Exhibit D-5; 
Defendant's Exhibit D-1) 
The first major misstatement of fact in 
Commonwealth's statement of facts is the last sentence of 
paragraph one on page five. It erroneously states that after 
Capitol received the proceeds check on the five lots that it 
transfered its interest in the escrow back to AGLA. 
Commonwealth gives no reference to the transcript in support of 
that conclusion and cannot because no evidence was presented to 
that effect. Even if that had been the case it is irrelevant 
because it is the respondent and not Capitol that still makes 
claim to the proceeds from the five lots and the respondent has. 
made no transfer of its interest. 
In the last paragraph on page five of Commonwealth's 
statement of facts, Commonwealth states that Mr. Hanks 
testified that in preparing the Assignment from AGLA to the 
respondent that he relied upon information supplied to him by 
AGLA to determine which lots should be included in the 
Assignment. That is true as far as it goes, but the testimony 
also was that the list of lots provided to the respondent by 
AGLA came from a list which AGLA received from Commonwealth on 
lots on which Commonwealth said there were still notes 
outstanding. (Tr. 15, 16) There was no objection to that 
-4-
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testimony and it was never controverted. That testimony was 
corroborated with testimony that on September 6, 1978 
Commonwealth delivered to AGLA a lists of lots with outstanding 
trust deeds which included the five disputed lots, thereby 
representing that the notes were still outstanding even though 
in fact they were not. (Defendant's Exhibit D-1; Tr. 52) So 
there were misrepresentations by Commonwealth other than the 
Acknowledgement. 
On page six of Commonwealth's brief, Commonwealth 
claims that Mr. Hanks testified that there were no 
representations from Commonwealth to the respondent other than 
the Acknowledgment and that in the telephone conversation 
between Commonwealth and the respondent, that preceded the 
Acknowledgement, there were no specific representations by 
Commonwealth concerning the status of any particular notes or 
subdivision lots. That characterization of the testimony is 
not accurate. Mr. Hanks testified that there were other 
misrepresentations. (Tr. 31-32, 35, 71). Mr. Hanks testified 
that in that telephone conversation he told Commonwealth's 
agent what would be in the Assignment, the reason for it, and 
asked the agent if he thought he would be able to give the 
respondent the assurance needed. To that question the agent 
responded that Commonwealth could give the assurance needed. 
(Tr. 31-32, 35) So Commonwealth knew that the Assignment was 
being drafted to transfer the beneficial interest in the notes 
and trust deeds to the respondent and that the respondent 
needed assurance that AGLA had the beneficial interest to 
-5-
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assign. (Tr. 31-32, 35) Subsequently Mr. Hanks testified 
that in that telephone conversation he told the agent for 
Commonwealth that the lots would be listed on the Assignment 
and that Commonwealth should not sign the Acknowledgment unless 
the lots described were available. (Tr. 35) Commonwealth 
signed the Acknowledgment even though five lots were 
unavailable. 
The last half of page seven of Commonwealth's 
statement of facts is another example of the introduction of 
immaterial facts. That discussion concerns whether the 
Assignment to the respondent fully satisfied the debt and 
concerns present value. Those facts are both totally 
immaterial for reasons that will be discussed. 
In summary the facts are that two separate entities, 
Capitol Thrift & Loan and Cape Trust, each had an obligation 
owed to it by AGLA. Because it was anticipated by AGLA and the 
respondent that both obligations would be satisfied from the 
proceeds of the sale of many lots secured by trust deeds, the 
parties involved Commonwealth because of its expertise. 
Commonwealth's expertise in real estate was necessary to assure 
the respondent that AGLA had the necessary lots available to 
satisfy both obligations. Commonwealth represented that the 
lots were available when in fact there was a duplication in 
that five of the same lots were to be used to pay on the 
obligation to Capitol and the obligation to the respondent. Of 
course the proceeds from the lots can only be credited once and 
therefore when the proceeds were used to pay Capitol, they were 
-6-
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not available on the obligation to the respondent despite the 
representation by Commonwealth that they were ava~lable. 
Therefore the respondent is damaged exactly in the amount of 
the notes which was the amount awarded by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE ALL SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD. 
The basic rules of review on appeal are that the 
findings and judgment of the trial court are presumed to be 
valid and correct; the record is reviewed in the light 
favorable to them and the findings and judgment of the trial 
court are not to be disturbed if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. R. C. Tolman Construction v. Myton Water 
Association, 563 P.2d 780 (Utah 19t7). The findings and· 
judgment of the trial court should not be upset on appeal if 
there exists any substantial evidence in the record supportive 
of the lower court's conclusions.- Town & Country Disposal, 
Inc. v. Martin, 563 P.2d 195 (Utah 1977); Wheeler v. Jones, 431 
P.2d 985 (Utah 1967); Weight v. Miller, 396 P.2d 626 (Utah 
1964); Thorley v. Kolob Fish & Game Club, 373 P.2d 574 (Utah 
1962); Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1975); Mccarren 
v. Merrill, 389 P.2d 732 (Utah 1964); Erickson v. Bennion, 503 
P.2d 139 (Utah 1972); Lake v. Pinder, 368 P.2d 593 (Utah 1962); 
Branel v. Utah State Road Commission, 465 P.2d 534 (Utah 1970). 
-7-
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It has been held that the Supreme Court will not upset the 
findings of the trial court unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary. Zions First National Bank v. 
First Security Bank of Utah, 534 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975); North v. 
Marsh, 504 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1973). If the findings are 
supported by any substantial evidence and reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, they will be upheld on appeal. Jensen 
v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1973). The trial court's findings 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly against 
the weight of evidence. Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 
P.2d 453 (Utah 1978); Ream v. Fitzer, 581 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978). 
As can be seen from respondent's Statement of Facts 
above and its Argument which will follow, all the material 
facts are supported by substantial, competent and admissible 
evidence. 
POINT II 
COMMONWEALTH MADE A MISREPRESENTATION 
TO THE RESPONDENT. 
It is difficult to imagine how Commonwealth can 
contend that there was no substantial evidence of 
misrepresentation by Commonwealth to the respondent when it is 
in writing in the Acknowledgment. The Acknowledgment says as 
follows: 
"Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company 
hereby acknowledges receipt of an executed 
copy of the foregoing instrument and hereby 
promises its performance to satisfy said 
agreement. Commonwealth Land Title 
-8-
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Insurance Company also agrees that it is in 
possession of the beneficial interest of 
promissory notes and second trust deeds 
covering the above mentioned properties and 
that it will not convey its interest in any 
way back to AGLA Development Corporation or 
any other entity not covered in the escrow 
agreement." 
In fact, Commonwealth did.not have possession of the beneficial 
interest of promissory notes and trust deeds for the five lots 
in concern. 
Commonwealth also contends that the Acknowledgment 
was not a representation that proximately caused respondent's 
loss. This is apparently on the theory that the Acknowledgment 
was executed after the Assignment. 
This theory is also fallacious because: 
1 . There were other misrepresentations before the 
Assignment was executed that proximately caused the damages. 
These representations included the telephone convers~tion 
between Commonwealth and respondent where Commonwealth 
represented, among other things, that it would not sign the 
Acknowledgment unless the facts therein were true. There was 
also Defendant's Exhibit D-1 wherein Commonwealth represented 
to AGLA that the five lots in concern had outstanding trust 
deeds, when in fact they did not. Defendant's Exhibit D-1 was 
given by AGLA to the respondent and was relied on by the 
respondent in making the Assignment. (Tr. 35) Even though it 
was delivered to AGLA, Commonwealth knew the respondent would 
be relying on it. So there were misrepresentations prior to the 
Assignment that proximately caused the damages. 
-9-
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2. The Assignment was not an agreement signed by the 
the respondent. It was not binding on the respondent until 
accepted. So the fact that it was signed by AGLA before the 
Acknowledgment is immaterial. From the evidence presented at 
the trial, it is evident that the respondent did not accept the 
Assignment prior to receiving the Acknowledgment. (Tr. 15, 16, 
24, 31-32, 35, 42-43, 47) 
3. The Assignment and Acknowledgment were in the 
same document and were all part of the same transaction. (Tr. 
15-17) Therefore, it is immaterial if the Assignment is signed 
first. Naturally it would be since it appears first. Both the 
Assignment and the Acknowledgment were executed the same day. 
Therefore, for Commonwealth's argument to stand, the 
court would have to believe that the Acknowledgment had no 
meaning and that it was drafted and executed for no reason. 
Obviously such is not the case. 
The final argument of Commonwealth, with regard to 
the issue of whether there was a representation, is that the 
Acknowledgment was an agreement and not a representation 
because the Acknowledgment says that the Commonwealth "agrees 
that it is in possession of the beneficial interest of the 
promissory notes and second trust deeds. . " Even if that 
were the case the result would be the same. If it was an 
agreement then Commonwealth breached the agreement to which the 
respondent was a third party beneficiary and caused the same 
damages. 
-10-
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POINT III 
THE RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE WAS REASONABLE. 
Commonwealth contends that respondent's reliance on 
the misrepresentation was unreasonable because the respondent 
had actual knowledge that Commonwealth was not in possession of 
the beneficial interest of the promissory notes and trust deeds 
and that the respondent had constructive knowledge that the 
trust deeds had been reconveyed because they were of record in 
the County Recorder's office. 
The respondent did not have actual knowledge. The 
only evidence about actual knowledge was that a check was paid 
to Capital which had the five lots in concern listed on the 
legend as being paid off and that Capitol applied the check 
proceeds to Capitol's loan. Mr. Hanks testified that he had no 
specific recollection of seeing the chec~. (Tr. 13, 33, 68-69) 
So even though there was other testimony that he may have seen 
the check, that was only speculation because he always 
maintained that he had no specific recollection. (Tr. 13, 33, 
68-69) Therefore, there was substantial evidence from which the 
trial court could, and did, conclude that the respondent had no 
actual knowledge. So when Commonwealth subsequently represented 
that the lots were unpaid, Capitol did not actually know 
otherwise, nor did the respondent. Even assuming any actual 
knowledge was conveyed to Mr. Hanks, it must be remembered that 
if he received the check, he did so as an officer of Capitol. 
That does not charge Cape Trust, a separate entity, with 
knowledge. 
-11 -
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Even though the check was paid to Capitol, the 
respondent had no duty to read the legend on the check and keep 
track of which lots were paid for. (Tr. 36) Commonwealth was 
an expert in the field and by undertaking the duties of Trustee 
under the Escrow Agreement, Commonwealth took on fiduciary 
duties. One of those duties was to keep track of what lots had 
been paid for and what lots had ~ot. The reason for involving 
Commonwealth in the beginning was to relieve the other parties 
from the responsibility and the expense of administering the 
receivables, making reconveyances and keeping track of the 
lots. (Tr. 40) Having given Commonwealth that responsiblity, 
respondent and Capitol Thrift & Loan, on their obligations, 
only had to apply the funds as they came in at various times 
and the lot numbers on the checks served no functional purpose 
for them. (Tr. 43) Respondent knew that an accounting 
regarding the various lots could be requested at anytime. 
(Tr. 36, 39, 43) 
There is further evidence in the record to support 
the finding that the respondent did not have actual knowledge. 
Even assuming Mr. Hanks read the legend on the check, he 
testified that it would not necessarily tell him that the check 
represented the beneficial interest that AGLA had assigned to 
the respondent in the Assignment. (Tr. 48) This is because 
there were other obligations secured by the same lots and 
' 
therefore, the check would not have necessarily exhausted 
-12-
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AGLA's interest in the lotso (Tr. 48) After that testimony the 
trial judge was of the opinion that the testimony was 
sufficient to shift the burden to Commonwealth on the issue of 
actual notice. (Tr. 50) That burden was never met. 
So the check did not actually give the respondent the 
knowledge required to make the reliance unreasonable. The lot 
numbers on the check were not included for the purpose of 
giving the respondent notice nor did it indirectly accomplish 
such a purpose. The lot numbers were written on the checks for 
the record keeping purposes of Commonwealth who had the duty of 
making reconveyances when the lots were paid for. The 
respondent did not actually know any facts precluding 
reasonable reliance. 
The cases cited by Commonwealth in its brief are 
cited for the principle that the reliance must be reasonable. 
While it is true that reliance must be reasonable, the cases 
are not otherwise on point. As was stated in the Jardine case, 
the right to rely depends on the circumstances of each case. 
The cases cited by Commonwealth all concern misrepresentations 
that could all be independently investigated by a lay person. 
In the case at bar, verification of the status of title to real 
estate cannot be done other than by experts. Where the 
misrepesentation itself is by an expert, the party relying on 
it has no duty to make an independent investigation. 
So the fact that the deeds of reconveyance had been 
recorded does not alter the decision in this case. A party is 
entitled to rely on a representation concerning the status of 
-13-
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property even though the true facts could have been ascertained 
by an examination of the public records. Barnes v. Lopez, 544 
P. 2d 694 (Ariz. 1976). It has been held that a vendee of real 
property has no duty to investigate to determine whether the 
vendor has misrepresented the area conveyed and said vendee is 
not estopped from recovering in an action for deceit because he 
had the opportunity to inspect the property. Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P. 2d 1239 (Utah 1980). The same rule of law should apply 
with regard to a misrepresentation of the status of title by an 
expert since title status is even more difficult to verify than 
acreage. 
"False statements and misrepresentations as to the 
existence of liens and encumbrances on property . . . are 
usually deemed to constitute actionable fraud, even though the 
liens and encumbrances are matters of public record." 37 Am 
Jur 2d §89, Fraud and Deceit. ''(W)here the parties do not 
stand on an equal footing, or where the means of obtaining 
information are not equal, the positive representations of the 
person who is supposed to possess, or does possess, peculiar or 
superior means of information may be relied on and under such 
circumstances, investigation may be dispensed with." 37 Am Jur 
2d §253, Fraud and Deceit. ''(A) representee has a right to 
rely upon representations where a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship exists between the parties. In such cases a high 
degree of frankness and fair dealing is required, and the 
representee cannot be charged with lack of diligence in failing 
to make an independent investigation, either at the time or 
-14-
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afterward." 37 Am Jur 2d §254, Fraud and Deceit. "(T)he law of 
constructive notice can never be applied as to relieve a party 
from responsibility for actual misstatements and frauds, and to 
prevent a representee from having a right to rely upon 
representations under such conditions. Thus, one to whom a 
misrepresentation is made is rtot held to constructive notice of 
a public record which would reveal the true fact." 37 Am Jur 
2d §262, Fraud and Deceit. "The· general rule is that the mere 
fact that public records, if examined, would show the 
representee that representations of fact are false, does not 
preclude his establishing fraud, because he is under no duty to 
make such examination . Thus, it has repeatedly been 
held that one· acquiring property is under no duty to examine 
public records to ascertain that the representer disposing 
thereof is really the owner. . . " 37 Am Jur 2d §263, Fraud 
and Deceit; Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc, 393 P.2d 287 
(Wash. 1964). "One has the right to rely generally on 
representations of fact in regard to title, and is under no 
obligation to search the records or otherwise exercise 
diligence in investigating the truth of the representations and 
it is no defense that he might have discovered the truth by so 
doing." 37 Am Jur 2 d §27 4, Fraud and Deceit. 
So the respondent had no duty to make an independent 
check of the record and is not charged with constructive 
notice. Any other conclusion would mean that in every case 
involving title insurance, for example, the insured would be 
under a duty to double check the recordings in the recorder's 
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office before relying on the insurer's representation as to the 
status of the title. Such is not the law. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
A review of the background and facts surrounding the 
Assignment will reveal that the damages awarded are the actual 
damages and any present value deduction is irrelevant. AGLA 
owed respondent some money. In full satisfaction of that 
obligation respondent accepted, after getting the 
Acknowledgment from Commonwealth, the anticipated proceeds from 
the lots, after taking into consideration present value since 
the lots were to be paid for in the future. So even if present 
value were relevant, it has already been taken into account. 
(Tr. 26) It was taken· into account in an attempt to pay the 
respondent a future amount that, when reduced to present value, 
would be equivalent to the obligation being satisfied. (Tr. 19, 
26) Present value only concerns an underlying obligation that 
is not before the court. 
This means that if the representations made by 
Commonwealth had been true then the respondent would have 
received the proceeds from the notes in the amount of 
$21 ,680.00 together with the interest called for thereunder. So 
the misrepresentation caused the respondent to lose exactly the 
amount that was awarded by the court. Any change from that or 
any present value computation would only alter the actual 
damages caused by Commonwealth. 
-16-
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With regard to damages Commonwealth also contends 
that they were not proven because the notes were not introduced 
into evidence. The notes were unnecessary because: 
1. The Trust Deeds state the amount of the 
obligation being secured and the terms of those notes are in 
the attachment to the Escrow Agreement. Both were received into 
evidence without objection. There was also other evidence. 
(Tr. 20; Plaintiff's Exhibit P-2; Defendant's Exhibit D-5) 
2. The dates, amounts and interests rates of the 
notes are all listed on Defendant's Exhibit D-1. 
3. There is no dispute as to any terms of the notes 
and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Utah provides that where there is no dispute as to a 
material fact, such fact may be proved by any relevant evidence 
and exclusionary rules will not apply. In Commonwealth's own 
statement of facts on the middle of page three, Commonwealth 
admits that the notes were to provide for the payment of the 
balance of the purchase price in full within six months with 
interest accruing at 10% per annum until the due date and 18% 
per annum thereafter. 
Commonwealth contends that the prejudgment interest 
award was erroneous because there was no contract between the 
respondent and Commonwealth which provided for the interest 
rate awarded and there is no Utah statute which authorizes such 
an award of interest. There does not need to be a contract or 
statute. This is a case for negligent misrepresentation and the 
respondent is entitled to be reimbursed for the actual damages 
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sustained. Because of the mispresentations of Commonwealth, the 
respondent lost not only the principal amount of the notes but 
the interest called for under the notes. It is as much a part 
of the notes as the principal amount. 
The rule in Utah is that in an action for fraud and 
deceit, the measure of damages is the difference between the 
actual value of what the party received and the value thereof 
if it had been as represented. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 
(Utah 1974) In the case at bar the actual value of the notes 
and trust deeds assigned on the five lots was zero. The value 
if they had been as represented was the face value of the notes 
in the amount $21 ,680.00 plus interest as called for 
thereunder. 
"In tort actions compensation most often takes the 
form of putting the plaintiff in the same financial position he 
was in prior to the tort. With contracts, compensation is most 
often stated in terms of placing the plaintiff in the same 
position he would have been but for the broken promise." 22 Am 
Jur 2d §12, Damages. In the case at bar the actual damage to 
the respondent was the amount of the notes and the interest 
called for. 
Where interest is part of the actual loss it is 
recoverable in a tort action. Sanders v. Park Towne, Ltd., 578 
P. 2d 1131 (Kan. 1978). "Interest is awarded as a part of the 
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damages recoverable for the nonpayment of a liquidated claim 
and although not stipulated for in any contract between the 
parties, it is allowed when the debtor knows precisely what he 
is to pay and does not pay it." 22 Am Jur 2 d § 180, Damages. 
If the amount claimed is liquidated or if the amount of an 
unliquidated claim is ascertainable by computation without 
resort to speculation, prejudgment interest is allowable as 
damages for withholding the amount due. Vermette v. Andersen, 
558 P. 2d 258 (Wash. 1976). In the case at bar the claim was a 
liquidated claim and Commonwealth knew the amount. "Where 
there is a contract governing the rate of interest, the 
contract applies." 22 Am Jur 2d §182, Damages. In this case 
the notes and the Escrow Agreement set the rate of interest and 
the respondent is a third-party beneficiary to those contracts. 
Finally, Commonwealth contends that prejudgment 
interest should not be awarded because it was not pleaded or 
prayed for by the respondent. This argument too must fail 
because: 
1. The prayer of the complaint asks for the 
principal amount, together with interest. 
2. General damages do not need to be specifically 
pleaded. General damages are those naturally and necessarily 
resulting from the harm done. Cohn v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 
537 P. 2d 306 (Utah 1975). Interest in this case is part of 
the general damages because it naturally follows under the 
terms of the notes when the notes are not paid. 
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It is special damages, rather than general damages, 
that need to be specifically pleaded. Even where the injury 
alleged is of such a character as to give notice to all of the 
damages which would of necessity follow, then, of course, items 
usually classified as special damages could be proved without 
pleading them. Cohn v. J. c. Penney Co., Inc., supra. In the 
case at bar Commonwealth knew that the damages to the respondent 
would be the amount of the notes and the interest rates set 
forth therein if not paid. "In Utah there does not seem to be 
an inflexible rule regarding the pleading of special damages. 
It is a question of whether or not the pleadings contain such 
information as will apprise Commonwealth of such damages as 
must of necessity follow from that which is alleged." Cohn v. 
J. C. Penney Co., Inc., supra. at 311. Commonwealth cannot be 
heard to contend that it was surprised by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
All the material facts are supported by substantial 
evidence and should not be upset on appeal. Commonwealth, an 
expert with fiduciary duties, represented in the written 
Acknowledgment that it was in possession of the beneficial 
interest of the promissory notes and trust deeds concerning 
five (5) lots when in fact it was not. Those same 
misrepresentations were also made previously in a written list 
of lots given by Commonwealth to AGLA and used by the 
respondent in preparing the Assignment and Acknowledgment. The 
Assignment and Acknowledgment were all part of the same 
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transaction and Commonwealth cannot excuse its misrepresenta-
tions on the basis that the Acknowledgment was not executed 
until after the Assignment and that, therefore, the 
Acknowledgment did not proximately cause the respondent's loss. 
The same misrepresentations were made before the Assignment was 
executed ·and, furthermore, the Assignment was not binding on 
the respondent upon execution by AGLA. 
The respondent did not have actual knowledge that the 
five (5) lots had been paid for. If that had been the case 
certainly the respondent woultl not have taken an Assignment for 
the anticipated proceeds from the five (5) lots in full 
satisfaction of an obligation. It is not logical to think that 
the respondent knew there would be no proceeds but took the 
Assignment anyway to set up Commonwealth. There is evidence in 
the record that the check did not give the respondent actual 
knowledge. As a matter of law therespondent is not charged 
with constructive notice because of the expertise of 
Commonwealth thereby giving the respondent the right to rely on 
the representations without making an independent 
investigation. 
The damages awarded are in conformity with law. The 
respondent is entitled to the difference between the value of 
th notes as actually received and the value if they had been as 
represented. That difference is the difference between zero 
and the amount of the notes. There is no need to introduce 
present value calculations because present value has already 
been taken into account and because the damages are the amount 
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of the notes. Present value would only be a factor if they 
were going to be paid before they matured. They have already 
matured and the damages are precisely as set forth by the terms 
of the notes. There is no dispute as to their terms. The 
damages were adequately pleaded and prayed for as awarded and 
Commonwealth was in no way surprised by the evidence. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
By JC M_ 2>. d 
David B. Boyce, 
Attorneys for Respon 
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